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The Corporal Nature of Collective Forms
Context
Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a 
hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a 
rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws. 
— The functions of words are as diverse 
as the functions of these objects. (And 
in both cases there are similarities.) Of 
course, what confuses us is the uniform 
appearance of words when we hear them 
spoken or meet them in script and print. 
For their application is not presented to 
us so clearly. Especially when we are do-
ing philosophy.  
§11 from Philosophical Investigations
by Ludwig Wittgenstein (2001: 6e).
The study of culture1 is a discipline reaching a 
critical stage in its development as an academic 
endeavor.  It is impossible to say whether this 
stage will be one of divergence or convergence 
with other branches of the social sciences and 
humanities, but the field is certainly evolving 
rapidly now at the beginning of the 21st cen-
tury.  As in biological evolution, quick develop-
ment occurs along a line of genetic mutations. 
The raw materials (be they ideas or chromosomes) 
multiply and beget new forms.  In this way, the 
life sciences provide the first and lesser of two 
metaphors in the examination of the state of 
cultural studies: reproduction and mutation. 
As cultural scientists struggle to categorize 
James F. McDonald is currently a researcher and lec-
turer in the field of US culture and communication at the 
Friedrich Schiller University in Jena, Germany.  He at-
tended Florida State University in his native United 
States and has been working at the Department of Inter-
cultural Business Communication in Jena since 2002. 
His most recent publication is a work of cultural history 
and cultural theory entitled Interplay: Communication, 










Cultural Flesh – Social Metabolism
James F. McDonald
their primary subject as precisely as possible by 
agreeing upon a definition of the word “cul-
ture,” they offer their colleagues, the broader 
scientific community, and an engaged public a 
variety of definitions designed (and sometimes 
contrived) to fit their discrete field – an engi-
neered academic strain, one might say.  
As in any moment of accelerated innovation, 
of dense and frequent mutation such as the con
temporary efforts to formulate a definition of 
the term “culture,” there will be productive and 
there will be useless growth.  In keeping with 
the evolutionary metaphor above, the intellec-
tual tissue from the discipline of cultural stud-
ies is being encouraged to mutate through 
means both natural and artificial.  The growth 
has yet to be diagnosed as benign or malignant, 
however.  In any case, it is a fact that one of the 
central tasks of cultural studies today remains 
the definition of its own jurisdiction2, leading 
to a situation that the German cultural scientist 
Jürgen Bolten describes as a “culture of culture 
definition.”3 (2009).  Indeed, the genealogy of 
the term “culture” itself can be traced back 
along many lines to singular essentialist for-
mulations in the 18th and 19th century and 
such explorations have been undertaken many 
times (cf. Jenks, 2004; Fuchs, 2005; Nelson & 
Grossberg, 1988). Following the terminological 
development of “culture” chronologically back 
again to our own time, though, is an exercise 
that reveals myriad influences precipitating a 
variety of claims on the concept itself.  In the 
last generations alone, the exploration of cul-
ture has been aligned closely with the relativis-
tic tendencies of postmodern thought and the 
absence of any claims to genuine sovereignty. 
And from an academic primordial soup, con-
temporary researchers have tried to splice to-
gether chains of cultural significance that nec-
essarily correspond only to their own fields of 
interest: pragmatic neo-essentialists, anglophone 
“cult studs” from literary backgrounds, and Eu- 
ropean cultural scientists who seem to approach 
the fundamental task of the definition of cul-
ture with more urgency than their New World 
counterparts.  As all parties undertake their own 
(and, not insignificantly, separate) efforts to de-
fine culture, the metaphorical mutation of the 
term accelerates.  What is culture to one group 
bears a different name to the other.  Here we 
must remind ourselves again of Wittgenstein’s 
words from the Philosophical Investigations 
above: “what confuses us is the uniform ap-
pearance of words when we hear them spoken 
or meet them in script and print.” (2001: 6e).  
Meeting the term “culture” in script and 
print is practically unavoidable in social sci-
ence texts of all registers.  Its “uniform appear-
ance” as a widely-used general term is a trap 
for the uninitiated and an obsession for devo-
tees.  Wittgenstein is the proper starting point 
for any analysis of the “culture of culture defi-
nition” since he reminds us throughout his 
own philosophical investigations that the prob-
lems in our philosophizing can be traced back 
to language problems. (2001: 19e).  A reasona-
ble diagnosis of the state of cultural studies 
might therefore be that the single term “cul-
ture” is a term fatigued from use in a number 
of both legitimate and illegitimate contexts.  If, 
for example, a culture is a narrow category ad-
dressing national characteristics (cf. Hall, 1990) 
while in other sources culture is intended to 
describe the social precipitate from acts of com-
munication (cf. Carey, 1992; Baldwin et al, 
2005), then the word obviously defies the de-
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in paragraph 242 of his work cited above: “If 
language is to be a means of communication 
there must be agreement not only in definitions 
but also...in judgments.” (2001: 88e).  Wittgen-
stein’s call for agreement is, in the narrow ex-
amination of culture, obviously unrealistic, but 
a division within the “uniform appearance” 
of the term culture is certainly possible.  The 
physiological metaphors of skin, flesh, and 
their physical extensions illustrate the borders 
that must be drawn to divide the word “cul-
ture” into more meaningful subcategories.
Placing inconsistent definitions of the term 
as well as its usage in a number of related but 
separate academic fields in apposition, we rec-
ognize a simple problem.  The expectation of a 
kind of terminological symmetry across disci-
plines becomes absurd, but is itself a fact that is 
rarely considered due to the insular nature of 
scientific research.  Furthermore, the “com-
mon-sense” interpretations of the word “cul-
ture” (e.g. art as culture, language as culture, 
nation as culture) are pervasive and cannot eas-
ily be dislodged.  In short, too much is de-
manded of the tiny word “culture,” once fa-
mously described by Raymond Williams as 
“one of the two or three most complicated 
words in the English language.” (1985: 87).  It 
has become impossible to apprehend because 
the term is pervasive both in daily life and in 
practically all texts of the social sciences and 
humanities.  The primary focus of a valuable 
new discipline has therefore been defined into 
meaninglessness. 
Metaphor
Culture, however, is not simply a residue, 
it is, as we have already considered, in 
progress; it processes and reveals as it 
structures and contains. Culture is the 
way of life and the manner of living of a 
people. 
from Culture by Chris Jenks (1991: 120).
The most valuable of the recent scholarship 
dedicated to the description of human culture 
has emphasized the processual nature of cul-
tures.  As an unintentional product of human 
interaction, culture must be understood through 
the kinds of analogies and terms more often 
applied to the study of corporal and envi-
ronmental systems.  That is to say that organ-
ic models and metaphors will always be the 
most appropriate when illustrating human be-
havior and its manifestations (in this case, cul-
ture).  Unintentionally but inevitably, culture 
arises as a product of human existence and in-
teraction4.  Similarly, the human body produc-
es its flesh – its physical form – in the absence 
of conscious effort (unintentionally but inevita-
bly, that is), offering us an apt metaphor for our 
widely cited but poorly defined subject.
Drawing the borders of culture and delineat-
ing what is and what is not a cultural system 
seems to be a core task of the academics who 
have contributed to the “culture of culture defi-
nition” in its present form.  Some insist that cul-
ture and language share a common jurisdiction 
(cf. Fishman, 1972).  Others forgo a precise defi-
nition and permit “culture” to be intimately 
connected to national sovereignty (Kymlicka, 
1997).  Still others attach the word culture to 
any act of human communication broadening 
the term to a condition of near universality 
(Van der Elst, 2003).  Surely all of these cultural 
concepts have certain merits and distinct appli-






Cultural Flesh – Social Metabolism
James F. McDonald
the same thing.  Wittgenstein’s “uniform ap-
pearance” seems to be a perfect diagnosis and 
reference to a perpetual desire among cultural 
scientists to clarify and redefine a term that 
everyone seems to understand already.
We can, however, use metaphor as a filter 
through which we can organize the inconsistent 
interpretations behind the uniform appearance. 
As stated above, culture is a natural system; 
it arises through no conscious initiative, but is 
vital to human survival as we know it.   The 
same might be said of our own corporal sys-
tems.  They too are unintentional and essential. 
Both culture and the flesh of our bodies grow 
and change over time and do so in separate but 
important contexts: the individual body ages 
while the flesh that defines a species evolves 
and adapts over generations.  Gradually, both 
bodies and cultures grow into new species that 
former generations would find unrecogniza-
ble.  Flesh becomes, metaphorically, a certain 
and specific category of what some individuals 
would call “culture.”  In this short survey, we 
will be more cautious than those individuals, 
understanding that flesh, in its vitality, muta-
bility, and its intimate connection to its sur-
roundings, can represent only one category of 
culture.  To understand what kind requires the 
addition of further metaphorical layers.
Extension
If clothing is an extension of our private 
skins to store and channel our own heat 
and energy, housing is a collective means 
of achieving the same end for the family 
or the group. Housing as shelter is an ex-
tension of our bodily heat-control mech-
anisms – a collective skin or garment. 
Cities are an even further extension of 
bodily organs to accommodate the needs 
of large groups.
    from Uderstanding Media: The Extensions 
of Man by Marshall McLuhan (1965: 123). 
Permitting the initial claim that the natural and 
intimate nature of flesh can be thought of as an 
analog to the natural and intimate develop-
ment of cultures of a certain type, then only the 
barest and most essential of both realms is ac-
counted for.  That is to say, without flesh we 
cannot exist.  It is a fragile system requiring 
sound metabolism and its perpetuation re-
quires the interaction with other compatible 
specimens.  Likewise, our innate and most per-
sonal cultural identity is not chosen (and, sig-
nificantly, can only be acquired after conditions 
of reasonable health have been established). 
This cultural analog to flesh represents one’s 
deepest socialization.  It corresponds to what 
some cultural scientists call a “narrow” defini-
tion of culture (cf. Bolten, 1997) and what Klaus 
Hansen calls the “special collective” (cf. 2009) 
when referring specifically to national catego-
ries.  For many, this most intimate of identities 
is that of the national culture.  It is often the 
most immediate among the many cultures and 
social systems to which one belongs5.  But it is 
not exclusive.  No individual leaves himself na-
ked and so easily described by a single set of 
cultural standards, just as bare flesh is in most 
cases a poor strategy for survival.  The meta-
phor demonstrates the greatest flaw in the nar-
row, common-sense models of cultural identity: 
our basic identity, while significant, is always 
accompanied by our involvement in comple-
mentary social systems.  To improve our un-
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able to extend our metaphor to accommodate 
any other legitimate uses of the term.  We can 
say that the flesh of the body corresponds met-
aphorically to national or religious categories 
of culture.  Indeed, the growth and evolution of 
the corporal systems closely parallel a category 
of the fatigued term “culture” that we will 
refine and narrow to the more specific form 
called “prioric culture.”6  In most cases, these 
prioric cultures will be social systems (i.e. com-
municative networks of multicollective indi-
viduals) in which admission and belonging to 
the discrete group is not freely chosen and ex-
traction from which is difficult due to social 
pressure or other barriers either ideological or 
institutional.  Analagous, perhaps to the con-
cept of primary socialization (cf. Berger & Luck-
mann) or the mechanisms of first-language-
acquisition, participation in the processes of 
prioric cultures will typically correspond to the 
narrowest and most common definitions of 
culture such as nationality, regional identity, or 
religious affiliation.  
Prioric cultures exist near the center of the 
network of related cultures and collectives to 
which an individual belongs (cf. Hansen, 2009), 
but so far, our analogy of flesh to prioric culture 
does not account for peripheral identities that 
are intentionally acquired later in life.  To ac-
count for them, we need to look to a further 
interpretation of human systems and indeed a 
further metaphorical analysis.  For a refine-
ment of the flesh/culture analogy we must 
turn to the sometimes controversial writing of 
Marshall McLuhan.  
While McLuhan’s work in the field of me-
dia and technology remains a source of pas-
sionate disagreement and debate (as well as 
frequent misinterpretation, it seems), his un-
derstanding of the tools human beings use in 
all their forms has a special significance to this 
study.  His definition of the word “medium”7 
allows us to expand our fleshy metaphor for 
culture to include the other acquired identities 
of our personal network quite neatly, for ex-
ample.  According to McLuhan, “the personal 
and social consequences of any medium – that 
is, of any extension of ourselves – result from 
the new scale that is introduced into our af-
fairs by each extension of ourselves, or by any 
new technology.” (1965: 7).  This passage is the 
key to the quote from McLuhan above.  He 
informs us that media are extensions of our 
corporal selves – of our very flesh.  The shoe 
extends the bare foot and the wheel extends 
the foot further.  Both are therefore media in 
McLuhan’s description.  Returning to the orig-
inal context with culture as flesh, we might 
use similar logic to extend our bare bodies – 
what we now understand to be symbolically 
linked to the prioric cultures of nation and re-
ligion.  For McLuhan, the extensions of the 
skin were obvious in daily life: clothing ex-
tends the human flesh protecting it against 
the elements or offering signals to mates and 
foes.  Another extension will be physical shel-
ter: a house, umbrella, or a fallout shelter. 
The model is so flexible that we can extend 
our skin outward to the boundaries of cities 
or the metal skin of a space station if we choose 
to.  Instead, we will return to the metaphori-
cal understanding of the extension of the flesh 
in a context of culture and multicollective 
identity.
Just as McLuhan recognizes that we supple-
ment our physical bodies with various media 
to aid in our survival as individuals and as a 
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of our prioric culture is subject to conscious ex-
tension.  It has been a ubiquitous criticism of 
certain forms of cultural studies that their em-
phasis is too narrowly placed upon a definition 
of culture as nation. (cf. Mathews, 2000; Bolten, 
1997). To be sure, the comprehension of nation 
as culture is a pragmatic and frequently effec-
tive way to understand cultural processes in 
daily life.  But no individual can be defined by 
her prioric culture alone just as no individual is 
judged or understood as a person by his bare 
flesh alone.  We intentionally “extend” our pri-
oric cultures by investing ourselves in what we 
will hereafter refer to as “deliberate cultures.”
As a man places a cap on his head to shield 
his bald scalp from the sun, or a figure skater 
attaches skates to her feet to allow her to glide 
more easily across ice, all individuals supple-
ment their prioric cultural membership through 
involvement in deliberate ones.  Globalization 
and the emergence in some parts of the world 
of what has been called a “lifestyle” society 
(Miller, 2001) permit multicollective individu-
als (cf. Hansen, 2009) to align themselves with 
ever more deliberate cultures.  Digital commu-
nication facilitates the establishment of new 
communities of like-minded people who inter-
act to inform and cultivate the social systems 
they can now access online.  The number of de-
liberate cultures we subscribe to bears little re-
lation to the actual number of hats or glasses 
we can employ to extend our corporal selves, 
but the principle is the same as that described 
by McLuhan.  We can describe ourselves in 
terms of the flesh, but the conclusions drawn 
from that description will be valid and incom-
plete until we employ deliberate cultures to ex-
tend and complement our prioric cultures. Just 
as the description of “an Englishman,” “a Jew,” 
or “a Chilean” may contain some statements of 
truth, exceptions to these generalizations will 
never be hard to find.  The dreadlocked, drug-
using German reggae fan does not fit well with 
the American stereotypes regarding people of 
that nationality, for example.  His existence 
may cause confusion for those who employ a 
rigid and narrow conception of culture, expect-
ing a young German to conform to precon-
ceived notions of order and arrogant intellectu-
alism.  In the example it should be clear that the 
prioric culture of the Rastafarian German has 
been somewhat eclipsed by his enthusiastic 
participation in other cultures that Kant, 
Beethoven, and perhaps even Einstein were 
unaware of.  Technological advances allow the 
German youth of today to “extend” his prioric 
culture in ways that were impossible even two 
generations ago.  His exposure to Caribbean 
music, fashion trends originating in urban 
New York and his communal consumption of 
North African hashish in an Amsterdam bar all 
contribute to the unique constellation of com-
municative influences that Hansen terms “mul-
ticollectivity.” (cf. 2009).  The national origins of 
these influences are incidental; the commu-
nities that cultivate them are deliberate and 
therefore not necessarily prioric cultures.  In 
our metaphorical context, however, these dis-
crete influences can be seen as the cultural Ex-
tensions of Man [sic] to paraphrase McLuhan. 
Our young man is still a German and may con-
form to the national stereotypes in some way 
(perhaps in his conscious defiance of them), 
but he extends this cultural flesh through the 
process of interaction, integration and contri-
bution to deliberate cultures via social metabo-
lism.  The opportunities for extension are lim-
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inconsistency (e.g. the Christian proponent of 
the death penalty or the self-proclaimed non-
conformist wearing sweatshop blue jeans to 
the protest). 
The apparent increase in “body modifica-
tion” in recent years (cf. Chao in Prelli, 2006; 
Rush, 2005) is an interesting analog to the si-
multaneous increase in the availability of pre-
viously inaccessible “deliberate cultures” from 
Facebook communities to foreign esoteric tra-
ditions.  The popularity of tattoos and non-
traditional piercings, for example, are corpo-
ral expressions of the expanded marketplace 
of “new” deliberate cultures.  Deepening the 
relationship through the metaphor of flesh 
and extension, it becomes clear that individu-
al multicollective opportunity – the extension 
of in di viduals’ ability to access and partici-
pate in an ever-increasing variety of cultures 
and collectives – is at once another way to un-
derstand “globalization.”  At the same time, 
the alteration and extension of the flesh turns 
the skin into a vehicle for the trappings of our 
deliberate collective identities.  The inherent 
and accidental foundation becomes little more 
than a framework upon which the constella-
tion of multicollectivity is hung.  Indeed, quite 
often these external expressions obscure the 
flesh altogether or else present it in intention-
ally appealing or offensive ways – all of which 
may be seen as the corporal analogs to the in-
creasingly common claims that the nation 
(and, consistent with our terminology, one 
species of prioric culture) is an obsolete cate-
gory (cf. Beck et al).  We use our prioric cul-
tures as a stage, therefore, upon which we cul-
tivate our deliberate cultures in the same way 
that the flesh bears our fashion, jewelry, or 
ink.
Distinction
We shift and bedeck and bedrape us /
thou art noble and nude and antique. 
“Dolores” by A.C. Swinburne (2009: 177).
Culture is a living thing.  To describe it one 
must acknowledge its life and mutability – its 
impermanence and its malleability.  As a young 
science, cultural studies must seek models to 
describe dynamic systems rather than static 
categories.  Cultural science should recognize 
that it is devoted to the description and analy-
sis of processes and the practitioners of this dis-
cipline must eschew rigid absolutes.  Culture 
is, for example, not our “software” (cf. Hofst-
ede, 2003;  Pedersen, 2007; Balkin, 2003) nor an 
absolute divine gift (cf. Arnold, 1993), nor is it a 
mere collection of attributes that can be listed 
and learned (cf. Benedict, 2006). Culture in its 
broadest sense is the most intimate and organic 
of our social creations.  It is our flesh, our skin, 
our organs, nourished by a corresponding so-
cial metabolism as vital as any corporal system. 
If it ceases to grow or is deprived of appro-
priate nutrition, it will die.  Individually it is 
unique, but it is comparable to and compatible 
with others of its kind.  Prioric cultures change 
slowly (sometimes reluctantly, sometimes in-
voluntarily) as the result of communication 
with other influences just as the species of or-
ganisms evolve according to changes in their 
environments.  And just as human beings are 
(at least nearly) unique in their ability to extend 
their flesh through the implementation of cer-
tain media, they are likewise able to extend 
their prioric cultures through the adoption of de-
liberate cultures.  
The division then of the term “culture” into 
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the obstacles in the navigation of the “culture 
of culture definition.”  The separation of these 
types, however, does facilitate the task in some 
way.  It will be possible, using the distinctions 
offered above, to recognize that the “culture” 
that Geert Hofstede describes in his “cultural 
dimensions” is a description of dimensions of 
prioric culture.  Likewise, the “cultures” that 
are the preferred domain of a great number of 
North American scholars – “hip-hop culture” 
(cf. Price, 2006), “consumer culture” (cf. Miller, 
2001), or “suburban culture” (cf. Ross, 2000) to 
name but a few – may indeed share certain 
characteristics with their natural prioric ana-
logs, but the subcultures, transnational identi-
ties, and microcultures that are prevalent in 
contemporary cultural studies become rather 
more comprehensible when they are seen as de-
liberate and distinct from the prioric cultures of 
religion and nation.  The same term, “culture,” 
cannot be used to describe both conditions 
without modification.
To be sure, Wittgenstein would not be molli-
fied by the single division of the “uniform ap-
pearance” of this fatigued term into two sepa-
rate but related subcategories.  This distinction 
will do nothing more than halve the amount of 
work that our tired terms will be forced to un-
dertake.  To be sure, there remain many incon-
sistencies, and the need for further refinement 
before we can imagine “agreement not only in 
definitions but also...in judgments.” (Wittgen-
stein, 2001: 88e).  Nonetheless, the introduction 
of the corporal metaphor into the description 
of prioric and deliberate cultures does much 
to distinguish and organize the terminology. 
Adding McLuhan’s novel understanding of 
how our flesh is supplemented in reality con-
tributes further to the apprehension of this vital 
but elusive term.  Through this metaphorical 
study, then, it should be clear that “culture” as 
a singular term is inadequate simply because 
its manifestations are so broad.  Seeking corpo-
ral parallels to the prioric and deliberate cul-
tures to which we belong (and belong to us), 
one quickly recognizes that they would include 
all human bodies, the clothes that present and 
protect them, the homes in which we live, and, 
as McLuhan reminds us, the cities in which 
these bodies live and interact.  To try to describe 
these phenomena with a single term is an ab-
surd task.  Dividing the work between the “pri-
oric” and “deliberate,” however, can illustrate 
the necessary separation between the national/
religious/regional primary socialization and 
the “deliberate” extensions that obscure, aid, or 
define the flesh.   
Notes
1 Known in some places as “cultural studies” 
and in others as “cultural science”.
2 Etymologically an extremely appropriate 
word in this context since it has become of 
critical importance to cultural scientists that 
they are able to say (dīcere) exactly where 
their authority (jūs) should lie.
3 “eine Kulturbegriffskultur”.
4 A corresponding definition or model in 
support of this statement would not be hard 
to find in much of the German cultural the-
ory from the last century.  Schütz, Luh-
mann, and Habermas, for example, have all 
attached communicational conditions to 
their respective “Kulturbegriffe.”
5 As evidence of their primacy, consider the 
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ste reo types: crass generalizations regarding 
others will often settle on the expected na-
tional or religious characteristics (e.g. “Ame-
ricans are fat and uneducated,” “The 
Japanese are disciplined,” “Muslims are 
terrorists.”) corresponding here to the cul-
tures into which one is typically born.
6 The revival of the seldom-used word “pri-
oric” (cf. Oxford English Dictionary) is un-
dertaken with caution and confidence.  The 
term refers to the cultural categories into 
which one is automatically admitted at 
birth.  This is not to say that the cultural fea-
tures assigned to the relevant national or 
religious categories are in any way innate 
(“a priori” in one sense).  Instead, the use of 
prioric indicates the immediacy and lack of 
intention inherent in these cultural systems. 
The corporal analogy is apt in this respect.
7 A term, quite unlike “culture,” that McLu-
han redefined in a context of relative con-
sensus regarding its meaning.
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